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Horwich: MEIC v. DEQ

COMMENTARY

MEIC V. DEQ: AN INADEQUATE EFFORT TO
ADDRESS THE MEANING OF MONTANA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROVISIONS
John L. Horwich*

I. INTRODUCTION

In October 1999, the Montana Supreme Court rendered a
decision in Montana Environmental Information Center v.
Department of Environmental Quality1 (hereinafter "MEIC") for

the first time interpreting the environmental quality provisions
inserted in Montana's Constitution in 1972.2 The parties
involved in the case, as well as the environmental and business
*

Professor and Director of Land Use Clinic, University of Montana School of

Law.
1. 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236 [hereinafter MEIC].
2. MONT. CONST.
art. II, §3 ("All persons are born free and have certain
inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful environment.. .. ");
MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("(1) The state and each person shall maintain and improve a
clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations. (2) The
legislature shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty. (3) The
legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life
support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent
unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.").
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communities in Montana, and certainly the justices of the
Montana Supreme Court, all recognized the potential landmark
status of the case. I, as a professor of environmental law in
Montana, and as someone who had published two law review
articles related to the subject of the case, 3 also eagerly
anticipated the Supreme Court's decision on this important
matter.
Upon hearing the MEIC decision had been released, I
promptly printed a copy from my computer and read through it
quickly. My initial reaction to the decision was confusion over
the exact nature of the holding. I studied the opinion further in
preparation for discussing it with my Introduction to
Environmental Law class. I wanted to ask my class what they
thought of the Court's holding, how they viewed the Court's
analysis and how they would advise the district court judge to
whom the case was remanded. What I discovered in preparing
for that class shocked me. The Supreme Court in MEIC had
rendered a decision of monumental significance to the citizens of
this state without fulfilling what ought to be even the minimum
standards of judicial decision making.
I wrote the initial drafts of this article shortly after the
Court rendered its decision. The article was not published at
that time; and I contemplated shelving the article for good,
partly in hopes that the case might return to the Court following
its remand and the Court could rectify the errors of its original
opinion, and partly out of reluctance to publicly criticize the
Court. In the ensuing 18 months, the district court on remand
found the case moot, 4 and my concerns with the Court's
approach have not found voice elsewhere.
The Court could have resolved the case in the plaintiffs
favor, as it did, without reaching the constitutional issues. 5 But,
3. John L. Horwich, Montana'sConstitutionalEnvironmental Quality Provisions:
Self-Execution or Self-Delusion? 57 MONT. L. REV. 323 (1996) [hereinafter SelfExecution]; John L. Horwich, Water Quality Nondegradation in Montana: Is Any
DeteriorationToo Much? 14 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 145 (1993).
4. Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, No. BVD 95-1184,
slip op. at 6 (Mont. June 16, 2000).
5.
The water well discharges at issue in the case were allowed by the state
pursuant to § 75-5-317(2)(j). Section 75-5-317(2) sets forth a list of activities (subsections
(a) through (t)) that may cause changes in water quality that the legislature has
determined are nonsignificant because of their low potential for harm to human health
or the environment. (See MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-317(1) (1995)). Because the activities
identified in subsections (a) through (t) are deemed nonsignificant, they are exempted
from the nondegradation review process that otherwise would apply to any activity
resulting in a decrease in water quality. (See MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-303 (1995) which

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/2

2

2001

MEIC
DEQ
Horwich:V.MEIC
v. DEQ

271

once the Court determined to decide the case on constitutional
The
grounds, it assumed an awesome responsibility.
with
and
fraught
were
complex
issues
in
MEIC
constitutional
implications. Along with them came sensitive political issues,
not only in the balancing of environmental and business
interests in a state where that balance is often difficult to strike,
but also in striking a balance between the legislature and the
judiciary. The decision to resolve this case on constitutional
grounds carried with it the obligation for the Court to
thoroughly understand the issues and implications of its
decision, to fully appreciate the literature and relevant court
precedents from Montana as well as other jurisdictions, and to
exhaustively and meticulously explain its rationale and provide
thoughtful guidance for lower courts, the legislature and
agencies faced with implementing the Court's decision.
The Montana Supreme Court failed to fulfill its
responsibilities in any of these areas. The Court's decision never
contain
mentions that any other state constitutions
(indeed, a third of all state
environmental provisions,
constitutions now contain such provisions); 6 it never mentions
sets forth the general nondegradation review process and the standards that govern
whether an activity may be authorized despite resulting in water quality degradation.)
In its entirety, § 75-5-317(2)(j) as it existed in 1995 provided:
(j) discharges of water from water well or monitoring well tests, hydrostatic
pressure and leakage tests, or wastewater from the disinfection or flushing of
water mains and storage reservoirs, conducted in accordance with departmentapproved water quality protection practices. (Emphasis added.)
The Court never considered the statutory condition that discharges from test wells are
deemed nonsignificant only if the discharge is conducted in accordance with Department
of Environmental Quality (DEQ)-approved water quality protection practices. The real
issue in this case was not constitutional-it was whether the DEQ's conditions were
adequately protective of the environment to meet the statutory standards established by
88 75-5-317(1) and 75-5-301(5)(c). In this case, the Court could well have determined
that the DEQ's conditions failed to meet these statutory standards, especially § 75-5301(5)(c)(iv) which required that greater significance be accorded carcinogens (such as
arsenic). This conclusion is further buttressed by the DEQ's rules adopted pursuant to §
75-5-301 which provide that a discharge containing a carcinogen is only nonsignificant if
the carcinogenic discharge is at a concentration less than or equal to the concentration in
the receiving water. (ARM 17.30.715(1)(b) (1995)). As a result, the Court could have
held in the plaintiffs' favor, overturning the nondegradation exemption as applied in this
case, without ever reaching the constitutional issues.
6. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7
(effective Jan. 7, 1969); HAw. CONST. art. IX, § 8, art. XI §§ 1, 9 (effective Jan. 1, 1979);
ILL. Const. art. XI, §§ 1-2 (effective July 1, 1971); LA. Const. art. IX, § 1 (effective Jan. 1,
1975); MASS. CONST. amend. art. XCVII (effective Nov. 7, 1972); MICH. CONST. art. IV, §
52 (effective Jan. 1, 1964); N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 21 (effective Nov. 2, 1971); N.Y.
CONST. art. XIV, §§ 4-5 (effective Jan. 1, 1970); N.C. CONST. art. XJV, § 5 (effective July
1, 1973); PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (effective May 18, 1971); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (effective
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that courts in other states have struggled with the meaning of
those provisions; it never discusses the legal issue of selfexecution which is universally acknowledged as critical to
interpreting such provisions; it never cites nor discusses the
substantial legal commentary on the subject of state
constitutional environmental provisions; and it never confronts
the Court's own precedents that are contrary to its decision. The
decision is also confusing, if not self-contradictory.
As the above comments make clear, this is not your
ordinary law review article, This article is not intended as a
broad discussion of Montana's constitutional environmental
provisions. I previously authored a piece offering a general
discussion of these provisions, and the reader is referred to that
piece for general background.7 Instead, this article has two
purposes. The first is a general critique of the Court's decision
making in the case. Regardless of how one feels about the
substantive conclusions reached by the Court, we all ought to
expect a higher quality of research, analysis and explanation of
the law by this state's highest court, at least when dealing with
issues of such significance. The second purpose for the article is
to discuss what the Court's decision means.
From my
discussions with the parties involved in the litigation, state
legislators and attorneys around the state, I believe there is
consensus that no one has much of an idea what the Court really
decided. Thus, the Court has come up short both in its approach
to the issues of the case and in its explanation of the holding.
With those purposes in mind, Part II of the article
summarizes the factual setting of the case, the legal issues and
the Court's decision. Part III then critiques the Court's decision
making process and analysis. Part IV contains some thoughts
on how the Montana Supreme Court might proceed, in light of
its inadequate effort to address the meaning of Montana's
constitutional environmental provisions.
II. THE CASE AND THE DECISION

A. Factualand Legal Setting
MEIC arose from the activities of Seven-Up Pete Joint

Nov. 3, 1970); VA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2 (effective July 1, 1971).
7. See generally Horwich, Self-Execution, supra note 3.
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Venture (SPJV) in connection with its proposed McDonald Gold
Mine Project near Lincoln, Montana. Operation of the mine
would have required that the area of the mine be dewatered;
that is, groundwater at the mine site would have to be pumped
out and discharged away from the mine site. In order to
evaluate the environmental effects of long-term dewatering,
SPJV sought approval in 1995 to operate several test wells.8
The water from these test wells was to be discharged into
the shallow aquifers of the Blackfoot and Landers Fork Rivers.
The pumped water contained arsenic at concentrations greater
than the arsenic concentrations in the groundwater to which the
pumped water was discharged. 9
Montana's nondegradation policy generally prohibits any
degradation of high-quality waters. 10 Under this policy, any
discharge into high quality waters, where the quality of the
discharged water is less than that of the receiving water, is
prohibited, unless the discharge is approved by the state
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) following a
nondegradation review." However, Mont. Code Ann. § 75-5-317,
contains a list of activities that because of their "low potential
for harm to human health or the environment" 12 are exempted

8. MEIC, 1999 Mont. 248, 1 8, 296 Mont. 207, 9I8, 988 P.2d 1236, 1 8.
9. Id. It 13-14.
10. MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-303 (1995). "High-quality waters" are defined in
section 75-5-103(9), in such a way as to include most surface and ground waters in
Montana. There was no dispute in this case that the waters receiving the discharge
qualified as "high-quality waters."
11. Before the DEQ can authorize a discharge that will result in degradation, the
DEQ must find that there are no economically, environmentally, or technologically
feasible modifications to the proposed project that would result in no degradation; that
existing and anticipated uses of state waters will be fully protected; that the proposed
project will result in important economic or social development and that the benefit of
the development exceeds the costs to society of allowing the degradation. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 75-5-303(2) - (3) (1995).
12. In addition to their low potential for harm to human health or the
environment, activities exempted under § 75-5-317 are found by the legislature to
conform to the guidance set forth in section 75-5-301(5)(c). The guidance in section 75-5301(5)(c) includes: (1) equating significance with the potential for harm to human health,
a beneficial use, or the environment; (2) considering both the quantity and the strength
of the pollutant; (3) considering the length of time the degradation will occur; and (4)
considering the character of the pollutant so that greater significance is associated with
carcinogens and toxins that bioaccumulate or biomagnify and lesser significance is
associated with substances that are less harmful or less persistent. § 75-5-301(5)(c). The
standards in section 75-5-301(5)(c) are also to be employed by the Board of
Environmental Review in establishing criteria by which additional activities may be
administratively characterized as "nonsignificant" and therefore exempted from
nondegradation review.
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from the nondegradation review process. These "nonsignificant"
activities may proceed without DEQ nondegradation approval,
although they still may not cause the receiving water to exceed
13
state water quality standards.
At the time of SPJV's application for approval to discharge
from the test wells, one of the nonsignificant activities identified
by the legislature in § 75-5-317 was:
(j) discharges of water from water well or monitoring well tests...
conducted in accordance with department-approved water quality
14
protection practices.
Pursuant to this statutory provision, the proposed test well
pumping by SPJV was not subject to nondegradation review by
the DEQ.
Nonetheless, the pumping was required to be
conducted in accordance with DEQ-approved water quality
protection practices. 15
Shortly after SPJV received DEQ's approval for the
discharge, MEIC and others filed suit against DEQ seeking,
among other things, an order requiring DEQ to subject SPJV's
request to nondegradation review and a declaration that the
statutory
nondegradation
exclusions violate
Montana's
Constitution. 16 The District Court, however, granted DEQ's
motion for summary judgment. 17 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the plaintiffs narrowed the issue, contending, at least in
cases where it is shown degradation will occur, the exclusion of
certain activities from review pursuant to Montana's
nondegradation policy as set forth in Mont. Code Ann. § 75-5-

13. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-605 (1995), which makes it unlawful for any
person to "cause pollution" of any state waters. "Pollution" is defined in the Montana
statutes to include, among other things, contamination or other alteration of the
physical, chemical or biological properties of state waters that exceeds that permitted by
Montana water quality standards. MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-103(25)(a)(i) (1999). A
discharge that is authorized under the pollution discharge permit rules of the board of
environmental review is not pollution. MONT. CODE ANN. §75-5-103(25)(b) (1995).
14. MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-317(2)(j) (1995). This section was amended by the
legislature in 1999 to limit its application to "discharges of water to ground water from
water well or monitoring well tests .... " (emphasis added). MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5317(20) (1999).
15. MEIC, 1999 MT 248, IT 8-9, 296 Mont. 207, IT 8-9, 988 P.2d 1236, IT 8-9.
Because of concern over the arsenic concentrations in the discharged water, DEQ
ultimately conditioned its approval of the discharge on the identification of mixing zones
in the groundwater. Id. at 9. A mixing zone is an area of receiving water in which
water quality standards may be exceeded in order to allow assimilation of the discharge.
Water quality standards may not be exceeded beyond the mixing zone. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 75-5-103(18) (1999).
16. MEIC, 1999 MT 17, 296 Mont. 17, 988 P.2d
17.
17. Id.
36.
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317(2)j) violates Montana's constitutional provisions regarding
8
the right to a clean and healthful environment.'
The DEQ responded, first that MEIC and the other citizen
environmental groups lacked standing to bring the action, and
second that Montana's statutory provisions and DEQ's actions in
the case did not violate the Montana Constitution. 19
B. The Decision
In deciding MEIC, the Court summarily found the plaintiffs
had standing to bring the action, 20 then moved on to the more
substantive matter of the constitutional question. It began its
analysis of the constitutional question by considering what level
of scrutiny should be applied to actions alleged to infringe on the
environmental rights, then discussed the implications of those
rights. A summary of the Court's conclusions is set forth below.
0

1. The Right to a Clean and Healthful Environment is a
FundamentalRight
The Court reached several conclusions regarding the nature
of the environmental rights established by the Montana
Constitution. The Court concluded that the right to a clean and
healthful environment guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights

18. Id. 37.
19. Id. 38.
20. I say the Court "summarily" found the plaintiffs had standing, because
although it identified the criteria used to establish standing, see id.
41, it failed to
apply the criteria to the plaintiffs. Instead, the Court simply recited language from two
1997 cases and concluded the plaintiffs' allegations established their standing to
challenge conduct that "has an arguably adverse impact on the area in the headwaters of
the Blackfoot River in which [the plaintiffs' members] fish and otherwise recreate, and
which is a source for the water which many of them consume." Id.
42-45. While the
focus of this article is on the Court's constitutional analysis, I note the Court's failure to
actually apply its cited standing criteria to the plaintiffs raises questions. The cited
criteria require an alleged injury to a property or civil right. Id.
41-45. The only
example the Court referred to in this regard was its recent decision in Missoula CityCounty Air Pollution Control Bd. v. Board of Enutl. Review, 282 Mont. 255, 937 P.2d 463
(1997), in which the Court based the plaintiffs standing on "potential economic injury."
MEIC, 1999 MT 42, 296 Mont. 42, 988 P.2d 42. Does this mean the plaintiffs in
MEIC have also shown potential economic injury? Or is it sufficient for standing for the
plaintiffs to have alleged threatened injury to a civil right - for example, the right to a
clean and healthful environment? The Court did not base its standing decision on the
allegation of a threatened injury to a civil right. However, the Court also made no
finding of threatened economic injury in this case. Thus, we are left to speculate
whether in the future an allegation of a threatened injury to a plaintiffs right to a clean
and healthful environment will suffice to support that plaintiffs standing.
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in Article II, Section 3 is a fundamental right,21 based on earlier
decisions of the Court that a right is fundamental if it is set
forth in the constitution's Declaration of Rights or it is a right
without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would
22
have little meaning.
The Court further concluded that the right to a clean and
healthful environment guaranteed by Article II, Section 3, and
the environmental rights set forth in Article IX, Section 1 are
interrelated and interdependent. 23
The Court did not
distinguish between the rights created by these two provisions;
indeed its subsequent discussion suggests the two may be read
together as creating a single right. At least for purposes of this
case, the Court saw no reason to distinguish between the two
provisions.
2. Actions Implicating the Right to a Clean and Healthful
Environment
Once the Court concluded that the constitutional right to a
clean and healthful environment is a fundamental right, the
question for the Court became what action implicates the right.
The Court framed the question as an inquiry into what level of
government interference with an individual's right to a clean
and healthful environment triggers judicial review of the
24
government action.
The state argued in this case, and the District Court agreed,
that whatever else the environmental provisions might mean,
they are not implicated unless the action complained of posed a
21. MEIC, 1999 MT 63, 296 Mont. 9163, 988 P.2d 9 63.
22. Id.
56 (citing Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d
1309, 1311 (1986) and In the Matter of C.H., 210 Mont. 184, 201, 683 P.2d 931, 940
(1984).
23. MEIC, MT T 64, 296 Mont. 63, 988 P.2d 9164. This conclusion should lead to
significant difficulties because of the delegation of authority to the legislature in Article
IX, § 1(2). If the constitution delegates to the legislature the administration and
enforcement of the rights and obligations of Article IX, § 1, and the right under Article II,
§ 3 is interrelated and interdependent, then it would seem the right under Article II, § 3
is also dependent on legislative action. As discussed infra, notes 63 to 64 and
accompanying text, this implication never occurs to the Court because the Court ignores
Article IX, § 1(2) entirely.
24. The majority opinion holds that these rights also may not be interfered with by
private action, although the case before the Court only dealt with government action.
MEIC, 9164, 296 Mont. 9164, 988 P.2d 9164. The majority opinion does not explain how
the principles of its decision would apply to private action. Both concurring opinions
reject the majority's extension of these rights to private action as beyond the issues
raised by the case. Id. 9T 83 & 86.
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demonstrable threat to public health or resulted in a significant
impact on the environment. 25 The plaintiffs argued, on the
contrary, that the rights are implicated by government actions
adversely affecting the environment well before those actions
pose a demonstrable threat to public health or result in a
26
significant impact on the environment.
The Court devoted a substantial portion of its opinion to
this important question.2 7 Beginning from the principle that
"[t]he prime effort or fundamental purpose, in construing a
constitutional provision, is to ascertain and to give effect to the
intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it,"28 the
Court examined at length the record of the Constitutional
Convention surrounding the adoption of Article II, Section 3 and
Article IX, Section 1.29
Persuaded by the notes from the Constitutional Convention,
the Court rejected the notion that the environmental provisions
were not implicated unless public health was threatened or
there was a significant adverse impact on the environment. 30
Instead, it determined that the provisions provided protections
that were "both anticipatory and preventative."3' 1
The Court concluded that the state action here, by which
the state authorized the addition of a known carcinogen into a
receiving water where the concentration in the discharged water
exceeded that in the receiving water, met the threshold
necessary to implicate the constitutional environmental rights.3 2
The Court relied for this conclusion, at least in part, on the fact
that the DEQ has an administrative rule that generally requires
that discharges containing carcinogens at concentrations greater
than the receiving water must undergo nondegradation review
before being allowed. 33

25. Id. [[ 35-37.
26. Id.
37.
27. Id. 1% 13-17.
28. Id.
76 (quoting from General Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 166 Mont. 510, 518, 534
P.2d 859, 864 (1975)).
29. MEIC, $1 65-76, 296 Mont.
65-76, 988 P.2d 9! 65-76.
30. Id.
78.
31. Id.
77.
32. Id,
79.
33. Id. This seems an interesting juxtaposition in which the court looks to an
administrative rule to overturn a statute.
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3. The Standardfor Determining Whether State Action Complies
with Montana's ConstitutionalEnvironmentalProvisions
Assuming that a state action meets the threshold of
environmental impact to implicate the right to a clean and
healthful environment, we then need standards by which a court
can determine whether the state action violates the right. The
Court could have determined that the right to a clean and
healthful environment is absolute-subject to no infringement.
As with most fundamental constitutional rights, however, some
infringement is acceptable under appropriate conditions. 34 The
task for the Court is to provide some guidance to the
circumstances under which the right to a clean and healthful
environment may be infringed.
4. Strict Scruinty
Courts have developed a hierarchy of scrutiny to reflect how
closely they will examine state action that infringes on a
personal right. In light of the Court's determination that the
right to a clean and healthful environment, as expressed in both
Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1, is a fundamental
right,35 the Court concluded that state action implicating this
right is subject to the most stringent standard of judicial review:
strict scrutiny. 36 A court may not simply accept on its face a
legislative or administrative determination that an infringement
of this environmental right is justified. A court must inquire
37
into the justification for and impact of the infringement.
5. Compelling State Interest
Consistent with earlier decisions by the Court that a
government action may intrude upon an individual's
fundamental constitutional right only if there is a compelling
34. See, e.g., the famous statement by Justice Holmes: "The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic.... The question in every case is whether the words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See
also Gilbert v. State of Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332 (1920) ("[freedom of speech] is
natural and inherent, but it is not absolute; it is subject to restriction and limitation.").
35. See supra note 21.
36. MEIC, 1999 MT 64, 296 Mont. T 64, 988 P.2d T 64.
37. Id.
61, 63. See also, Wadsworth v. State, 275 Mont. 287, 303, 911 P.2d
1165, 1174 (1996).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/2

10

2001

Horwich:
v. DEQ
MEICMEIC
V. DEQ

279

state interest for doing so, 38 the Court, established that an
infringement of the environmental right may only be justified if
the infringement is necessary to further a compelling state
interest.3 9 The Court did not further explain what it meant by a
"compelling state interest" in this context, except for its
instruction that on remand the District Court was to determine
"whether there is a compelling state interest for the enactment
of the statute based on the criteria we articulated in Wadsworth
40
v. State."
6. Means Closely Tailored to the Ends
When a court requires that a government action must
advance a compelling state interest if it is to be allowed to
infringe on a fundamental right, the focus is on the end sought
to be achieved by the government action. The Court in MEIC
also established standards for reviewing the means selected by
the state to accomplish the compelling state interest. In quoting
with approval from Wadsworth, the Court noted that the state
action must be "closely tailored to effectuate only that
compelling state interest," and in order to sustain the invasion
of a fundamental right, the state must show that "the choice of
legislative action is the least onerous path that can be taken to
achieve the state objective." 4 1 If the state must infringe on a
fundamental right in furtherance of a compelling state interest,
then that infringement must be as slight as possible while still
furthering the state objective.

38. State v. Pastos, 269 Mont. 43, 47, 887 P.2d 199, 202 (1994); Wadsworth v.
State, 275 Mont. at 302, 911 P.2d at 1174 (1996).
39. MEIC, 1 63-64, 296 Mont. 9 63-64, 988 P.2d 9 63-64.
40. Id. 1 81. In Wadsworth, the Court did not actually provide any criteria for
identifying a compelling state interest. The Court did hold that when the government
intrudes upon a fundamental right, any compelling state interest for doing so must be
closely tailored to effectuate only that compelling state interest, and that to sustain the
validity of an invasion to a fundamental right, the state must also show that the choice
of legislative action is the least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the state
objective. 275 Mont. at 302, 911 P.2d at 1174. However, neither of these "criteria"
address the question of what constitutes a compelling state interest. While the Court in
Wadsworth concluded that the state action in that case (limiting a state employee's right
to engage in other employment) was not supported by a compelling state interest, the
Court never provided any criteria or guidance on how one distinguishes a compelling
state interest from one that is not compelling.
41. MEIC, 9161, 296 Mont. 1 61, 988 P.2d 1 61 (quoting Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at
302, 911 P.2d at 1174).
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7. Elements of the Standardfor DeterminingWhether State
Action Complies with Montana's ConstitutionalEnvironmental
Provisions
The MEIC decision seems to establish several elements of
the standard for determining whether a state action that
implicates Montana's constitutional environmental right
complies with that right:
1. The state action will be subject to strict scrutiny by the
courts;
2. The action will be upheld only if it furthers a compelling
state interest; and
3. The action must be limited so as to interfere with the
right to the least amount possible while achieving the state's
objective.
In the Court's words:
[Any statute or rule which implicates [the environmental] right
must be strictly scrutinized and can only survive scrutiny if the
State establishes a compelling state interest and that its action is
closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the least
onerous
42
path that can be taken to achieve the State's objective.

This is the Court's most logical and succinct statement of
the relevant standards for implementing the environmental
right. Unfortunately, the process by which the Court arrived at
this conclusion was flawed and the Court's characterization of
the issues on remand varied from this statement of the relevant
standards.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S DECISION MAKING PROCESS
AND ANALYSIS

Interpreting constitutional provisions is always important

and often difficult. My criticisms of the Court do not flow from a
belief that constitutional interpretation is easy. Quite the
contrary, they are based upon a belief that constitutional
interpretation is complex. Courts need to exploit every available
resource to assist in such a significant task. The overarching
theme of my criticism is the failure of the Court in MEIC to
appreciate and confront the underlying legal issues posed by the
case. The Court appears satisfied to deal with the issues posed
by this case on only the most superficial level, without

42.

Id. 1 63.
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appreciating either the context or implications of the decision. 43
More specifically, as discussed below, from all appearances
the Court overlooked the substantial decisions from other
jurisdictions and the significant professional commentary on
state constitutional environmental provisions. In contrast to
other courts and commentators, the Court does not frame its
analysis of these constitutional provisions to address the issues
of self-execution and the separation of legislative and judicial
authority. Finally, the Court fails to either distinguish or
overrule its own conflicting precedents.
Some attorneys and students who reviewed drafts of this
article have asked why any of this makes a difference. Would
the Court have reached a different decision if it had approached
the issues as I will be suggesting? The truth is that I do not,
and cannot, know whether the outcome of the case would have
been any different. But, therein lies much of my concern.
First, a court's decision, even that of the highest court of the
state, earns its legitimacy not from the mere pronouncement of
"the law of the land," but from a reasoned analysis based upon
precedent, logic and policy. That, after all, is one of the reasons
courts issue opinions, rather than merely render decisions. It is
difficult to grant much legitimacy to a judicial opinion that fails
to acknowledge and confront conflicting precedent - both its own
and that of other jurisdictions, and fails to address the
significant legal issues, in this case, self-execution and
separation of powers, that dominate the legal literature and
other court opinions. Thus, I, and others, cannot critique the
Court's analysis of these issues or argue how the Court's
decision should have been different, or why the Court's decision
is correct, because the Court did not provide any analysis of
these issues in the first place. To this extent, the Court's
decision is vulnerable to criticisms that detract from a focused
discussion of the substantive issues.
Second, by providing such an inadequate analysis of the
issues in the case, compounded by internal inconsistencies in the
opinion, the Court has created unnecessary confusion. Certainly
43. As I have discussed the following criticisms with colleagues around the state
and with students, I am invariably asked why I believe the Court rendered such an
inadequate decision. I don't have an answer. I know all of the justices of the Court, and
I have no reason to assume ill-motives or a dereliction of duty on the part of any of them.
I know the Court's workload is horrendous and that may well have contributed to
inadequate attention to the difficult issues posed by this case. Ultimate responsibility,
however, rests with the entire Court - all of whom joined in most of the majority
opinion and none of whom demanded rigor.
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one objective of a Supreme Court opinion is to provide insight
and guidance to those who will subsequently be affected by the
Court's decision. There was never any doubt that many in
Montana would be looking to this opinion for guidance on the
meaning of Montana's constitutional environmental provisions.
That is not to suggest the Court is obliged to deliver a treatise
on the subject, nor should the Court decide issues not before it.
But it is to suggest the Court should render a thorough analysis
of the important issues before it and the Court should write its
opinion with due regard for the legislators, state agency
personnel and citizens of the state who will be looking to the
opinion for important guidance.
A. We Are Not Alone: Other States and Courts Have Faced These
Issues
As noted in a recent, thoughtful article on the subject of
state constitutional environmental provisions:
All state constitutions written since 1959 have included
environmental provisions addressing, to varying degrees, modern
concerns of pollution and preservation. Half a dozen states with
pre-1960 constitutions also have amended their constitutions to
address broad environmental concerns. In total, over a third of all
44
state constitutions now contain environmental policy provisions.

In MEIC, the Court never mentions that other state
constitutions have similar environmental provisions or that
other state high courts have confronted what those provisions
mean. 45 Certainly, the Montana Court is not bound by either
the approaches adopted by those other courts or the conclusions
reached by those courts. It is, nevertheless, troubling that the
Court apparently found it unnecessary to consider how other
state courts have dealt with such a significant issue.
In the context of this case, this "isolationism" allowed the
Court to overlook two of the most significant issues raised by
these types of constitutional provisions.
Courts that have
struggled with interpreting and applying these types of
constitutional environmental provisions have been concerned
44. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The
Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 871 (1996).
45. Montana is not alone in seeking the meaning of state constitutional
environmental provisions. In the past two-and-a-half decades, numerous states have
adopted entirely new constitutions containing environmental provisions, or they have
amended their constitutions to add environmental provisions. Time and again, state
courts have limited the impact of these environmental provisions. Horwich, SelfExecution, supra note 3, at 325-26. (Citations omitted.)

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/2

14

2001

Horwich:
v. DEQ
MEIC MEIC
V. DEQ

283

with the active role the judiciary would have to play in setting
environmental standards. 46 For thirty years our federal and
state legislatures and our federal and state environmental
administrative agencies have struggled with establishing
environmental standards applicable to air pollution, water
pollution, and hazardous and toxic substances. Injecting the
judiciary as the final arbiter of environmental quality is a step
not to be taken lightly.
This is not to say the Court is wrong to inject the Montana
judiciary into that position. It is to say, however, that the Court
is wrong to do so without acknowledging on the record that such
a decision is fraught with difficulties 47 and explaining why,
48
despite these difficulties, the Court deems it proper to do so.
The second issue this "isolationism" conceals is that most
other courts addressing the meaning of state constitutional
environmental provisions have applied a fairly consistent
analytical framework to these provisions. 49 As discussed in the
46. Thompson, supra note 44, at 895-96:
[T]he traditional justifications for environmental policy provisions, moreover,
would require the courts to play an active role in shaping and controlling state
environmental policy-a role that courts neither appear to want nor are well
designed to undertake .....
In theory, of course, courts could develop their own
judicial environmental policies and rules-directly enjoining private and public
actions that threaten a "healthful" environment. Yet here again courts have
refrained from taking an active role. Courts occasionally have interceded in
extreme situations where state agencies, without any consideration of the
possible environmental implications of their actions, have granted permits or
pursued projects that posed an environmental threat.
For this reason,
environmental policy provisions were of some value in the 1970s, before state
environmental assessment acts were in place and before the environment was
integrated into most state programs. Courts, however, have refused to use
environmental policy provisions as a general means of regulating the specific
actions of governmental or private entities. As a result, environmental policy
provisions have played an increasingly marginal role in those states where
they are found.
See also, e.g., the discussion by Professor J.B. Ruhl on the "innumerable conundrums"
that an environmental quality amendment to the federal constitution would pose. J.B.
Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed Environmental
QualityAmendments Don't Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L.R. 245, 276-77 (1999).
47. Indeed, difficulties of such magnitude have dissuaded most other courts from
placing the judiciary in that position. See supra note 46.
48. This is a prime example of a topic where I have been asked whether it would
have made any difference to the Court's decision if the Court had addressed the issues I
think are important. Obviously, I cannot know whether the members of the Court would
have been influenced by a consideration of these topics. Certainly, I believe these issues
are central to a decision interpreting and applying these environmental provisions.
49. See, e.g., Upper Big Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. City of Fremont, 495
N.W.2d 23 (Neb. 1993); Borough of Moosic v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n., 429 A.2d
1237 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981); Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 324 S.E.2d 674 (Va. 1985);
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next section, the academic literature on the subject and the
court decisions on point from other jurisdictions consistently
analyze these provisions from the point of view of the legal
theory of self-execution. By never acknowledging this literature
or these other opinions, the Court avoids confronting the theory
that has persuaded other courts to rule against the judicial
enforcement of similar provisions. 50
B. The Threshold Issues of Self-Execution and the Separationof
Legislative and JudicialAuthority
According to most courts and commentators, the first
question for a court when asked to employ a constitutional
provision as a judicially enforceable right, obligation or limit is
whether the provision is self-executing. 1 Traditionally, a
constitutional provision is considered self-executing if the
judiciary can enforce the provision without the aid of a
legislative enactment. 52 By contrast, under traditional selfexecution analysis, a non-self-executing provision lies dormant
until given legal effect by the legislature. 53 At its essence, then,
the question of self-execution is a question of the respective roles
of the legislature and the judiciary. If a provision is non-selfexecuting, the substance of the constitutional provision is
determined by legislative action. On the other hand, if the
constitutional provision is self-executing, the judiciary may
provide the substance of the provision through judicial
interpretation. Because of the significance of these separation of
powers issues, most courts confronting similar constitutional
provisions have begun their analysis with the question of
whether the provisions at issue are self-executing. 54
In MEIC, the Court never employed the phrase "selfexecution" and the Court ignored the separation of powers issues
raised by self-execution. But perhaps even more troubling, the
Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973).
In addition to ignoring relevant cases from other jurisdictions, the Court neither cites
nor acknowledges the extensive commentary on the subject in legal journals. See the
numerous articles referenced in my article, supra note 3 and two excellent articles
published since: Thompson, supra note 46 and Ruhl, supra note 46.
50. See cases cited supra note 49.
51. Horwich, Self-Execution, supra note 3, at 334 and commentators and cases
cited therein.
52. For a fuller discussion, see Horwich, Self-Execution, supra note 3, at 335.
53. Id.
54. For general background and a more in-depth discussion of self-execution, see
Horwich, Self-Execution, supra note 3, at 335-38.
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Court disregarded its own precedents dealing with self-execution
and state constitutional provisions. Reading the MEIC decision
one would presume the Montana Supreme Court had never
considered the issue whether a state constitutional provision
was self-executing. On the contrary, the Court has specifically
55
addressed this issue several times in the past.
Squarely on point is the Court's decision in State ex rel.
Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corporation in which the
Court confronted a constitutional provision addressing
lotteries.5 6 Article XIX, § 2 of Montana's 1889 Constitution
provided:
The legislative assembly shall have no power to authorize
lotteries, or gift enterprises for any purpose, and shall pass laws to

prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enterprise tickets in this state.
Although the constitutional provision left no doubt that its
drafters and those who voted for the provision desired to outlaw
lotteries in Montana, the Court reaffirmed its obligation to
57
interpret only the language employed in the provision.
Because that language did not itself outlaw lotteries, but instead
mandated that the legislature do so (which it had not done), the
Court agreed with the defendant that its games of chance were
not illegal.5 8 The Court stated: "The obvious meaning of the
words cannot be ignored in order to obtain a short-cut, however
59
desirable the end."
Stafford also illustrates the Montana Supreme Court's
historical respect for the separation of powers as a fundamental
principle of constitutional interpretation. The legislature had
not responded to the clear mandate in the constitution for
legislation making lotteries illegal. In Stafford, the state asked
the Court to do what the legislature had failed to do: outlaw
lotteries as desired by those who drafted and adopted the
constitutional provision. Even though outlawing lotteries and
similar games of chance is not a complicated matter, 60 the Court
55.
State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox Great Falls Theatre Corp., 114 Mont. 52, 132 P.2d
689 (1942); In re Lacy, 239 Mont. 321, 780 P.2d 186 (1989). See also General Agri. Corp.
v. Moore, 166 Mont. 510, 534 P.2d 859 (1975); Weston v. State Highway Comm'n, 186
Mont., 46, 606 P.2d 150 (1980).
56. 114 Mont. 52, 132 P.2d 689 (1942).
57. 114 Mont. at 72, 132 P.2d at 699.
58. Id. at 81, 132 P.2d at 703-04.
59. Id. at 72, 132 P.2d at 699.
60. Indeed, it would seem a much simpler matter for the Court to outlaw lotteries
and games of chance than to establish what level of environmental impact crosses the
threshold of a "clean and healthful" environment.
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steadfastly refused to tread on turf clearly dedicated to the
legislature. "We agree, of course, that the constitutional purpose
should be obeyed; but so should the more fundamental
constitutional purpose that the legislative function be not
61
usurped by the judicial branch."
Why should Stafford, and other related precedents, be
relevant to MEIC? For one thing, both cases squarely confront
the Court with resolving the relative roles of the legislature and
judiciary in implementing a constitutional provision.
In
Stafford, the constitution mandated that the legislature "shall
pass laws to prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enterprise tickets
in this state."62 The legislature having failed to pass such laws,
the Court concluded it was powerless to implement the
constitutional prohibition against lotteries. The people in their
Constitution had delegated that authority to the legislature and
not the judiciary.
In reading MEIC, one might never see the parallel with
Stafford. That is because when the Court quotes from Article
IX, Section 1 of the constitution, it includes subsections (1) and
(3), but deletes subsection (2). In its entirety, Article IX, Section
1 provides as follows:
(1) The State and each person shall maintain and improve a clean
and healthful environment in Montana for present and future
generations.
(2) The legislature shall provide for the administration and
enforcement of this duty.
(3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the
protection of the environmental life support system from
degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent
unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.

In quoting Article IX, Section 1 in its opinion, the Court.
says it is quoting the section "in relevant part."63 How is
subsection (2) not relevant, particularly in light of the Court's
own precedents such as Stafford?64 Subsection (2), just like the
provision at issue in Stafford, reflects the intention of the

61. Id. at 80, 132 P.2d at 703.
62. Mont. Const. art XIX, § 2 (1889)
63. MEIC, 1999 MT 248, 48, 296 Mont. 207, 1 48, 988 P.2d 1236, 48.
64. If an attorney in a brief to the Court were to so selectively quote from Article
IX, Section 1, it would likely be grounds for sanction as a clear effort to mislead the
court. MONT. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1999). ("A lawyer shall
not knowingly ...
fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and
not disclosed by opposing counsel.")
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drafters and adopters of the constitution to defer to the
legislature and not to the courts.
In MEIC, the Court relies heavily in justifying its decision
on the principle that in construing a constitutional provision, the
Court's fundamental purpose is to ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it.65 As
such, it would seem that the Court must address the clearly
expressed intent that it is the legislature and not the Court that
is to administer and enforce the constitutional mandate for a
66
clean and healthful environment.
C. The Trap of Looking to "Intent"
Having concluded that the constitutional environmental
provisions create judicially enforceable rights, the Court turned
to the substantive content of those rights. The Court had to
address what is meant by the constitutional standard that
requires, both in terms of the individual right and the state
obligation, a "clean and healthful environment." As discussed
previously, the state argued that these
environmental
provisions are not implicated unless the action complained of
poses a demonstrable threat to public health or results in a
significant impact on the environment. 67 The plaintiffs, on the
other hand, argued that these environmental rights are
implicated by government actions adversely affecting the
environment well before those actions pose a demonstrable
threat to public health or result in a significant impact on the
environment.
One of the resources to which courts may turn for assistance
in interpreting constitutions, like statutes, is the intent behind
the provision. The Court in MEIC noted:
The prime effort or fundamental purpose, in construing a
constitutional provision, is to ascertain and to give effect to the
intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it. The court,
therefore, should constantly keep in mind the object sought to be

65. MEIC, 77, 296 Mont. 77, 988 P.2d 77. See additional discussion on this
infra, note 68 et seq. and accompanying text.
66. The Court's approach encourages a cynical view that the Court is at liberty to
select which "intent" of the framers and adopters it wishes to implement-even to the
point of deleting relevant language expressing an intent contrary to that which the
Court wishes to enforce. The foregoing discussion is not intended to suggest that the
MEIC decision should have been dictated by the Court's earlier decision in Stafford. It is
to suggest, however, that it is either arrogance or ignorance to decide MEIC without
either expressly overruling or distinguishing Stafford (among other cases).
67. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2001

19

288

MONTANA
REVIEW
Montana Law
Review, Vol.LAW
62 [2001],
Iss. 2, Art. 2

Vol. 62

accomplished.., and proper regard should be given to the evils, if
any, sought to be prevented or remedied.. ..68

Indeed, it is clear from a reading of the case that the Court
placed significant weight on the record of the 1972
Constitutional Convention when addressing the substantive
content of the right to a clean and healthful environment. The
Court devoted more than four pages of its opinion to a review of
the deliberations on the environmental provisions by the
Natural Resources and Agricultural Committee and the full
Convention. After which the Court stated:
We conclude, based on the eloquent record of the Montana
Constitutional Convention that to give effect to the rights
guaranteed by Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1 of the
Montana Constitution, they must be read together and
consideration given to all of the provisions of Article II, Section 1
as well as the preamble to the Montana Constitution. In doing so,
we conclude that the delegates' intention was to provide language
and protections which are both anticipatoryand preventative. The
delegates did not intend to merely prohibit that degree of
environmental degradationwhich69can be conclusively linked to ill
health or physical endangerment.

This is an important conclusion going to the very essence of the
substantive reach of these environmental provisions.
The Court may be correct in its conclusion emphasized
above regarding the intention of the delegates to the
Convention. But the matter is not so simple-based upon the
Court's own criteria and the history of these provisions as
recited by the Court. Recall that the Court recited that "the
prime effort or fundamental purpose, in construing a
constitutional provision, is to ascertain and to give effect to the
intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it."70 The
Court, in reviewing the minutes from the Convention
deliberations, may gain some insight into the intent of those
who "framed" the provision. But what of the intent of those who
"adopted" the provision-i.e., the citizens of the state who voted
to approve the constitution in 1972? Relying on the intent of
those who adopted the provision raises serious questions in state
constitutional law, and most especially in the circumstances
surrounding these environmental provisions.
The first obvious issue is how one can even presume to know
the intent of those who adopted the provision. What was in the
68.
69.
70.

MEIC, 76, 296 Mont. 76, 988 P.2d
Id. 77 (emphasis added).
Id. 76.
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minds of the state's citizens who voted to approve the provision?
This is made even more difficult where, as here, the citizens
voted on an entire constitution-not just the provision now before
the Court. Maybe most of the voters objected to this particular
provision-but on balance they preferred the new constitution to
the old. Could we then ignore this provision-since the intent of a
majority of those who adopted it was that it be ignored?
State constitutions are not like legislation where we can at
least hope to discern the intent of the adopters, since the
adopters debate the provision in committee hearings and on the
floor of the legislature. Indeed, with regard to legislation, the
framers are a subset of the adopters and the adopters have
ready access to statements of intent. The situation is obviously
far different concerning a state constitution when the adopters
are the general population and the framers are a small group
whose deliberations, while publicly available, we cannot assume
were in the minds of most voters.
This particular situation highlights this dilemma. The
Court notes that Article IX, Section 1 when reported to the floor
of the Constitutional Convention by the Natural Resources and
Agricultural Committee required that "the state and each
person.., maintain and enhance the Montana environment for
present and future generations." 71 The record of the convention
reveals that the majority of the committee intentionally did not
add adjectives such as "healthful" or "unsoiled" because they
believed that such qualifications might allow some to argue that
the environment could be adversely affected so long as the
adverse effect did not reach the threshold of an adverse health
effect. The majority of the committee believed their proposal
72
was stronger than if the word "healthful" were added.
When the committee's proposal came before the entire
convention, there was further discussion on whether the
provision should simply require the state and each citizen to
maintain and enhance the Montana environment or whether the
standard of environmental quality should be expressed by
adjectives such as "clean" and "healthful."73 Delegates from the
Natural Resources and Agricultural Committee reiterated their
belief that the language as reported by the committee without

71.
72.
73.

Id. 166.
Id.
Id.
66-68.
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adjectives was the most protective of the environment.7 4 Other
convention delegates, however, insisted that the provision would
be made stronger, not weaker, by the addition of descriptive
language such as "clean and healthful."7 5 In the end, the
Convention agreed on the version including the adjectives
"clean" and "healthful" even though a majority of the committee
members who oversaw the drafting of the section believed that
language would reduce the environmental standard they wanted
to establish.
So, when the citizens of Montana entered the ballot booth to
vote, did they interpret "clean and healthful" as setting a less
protective standard, as the majority of the committee believed,
or did they believe it was even a stronger standard than would
be the case without those terms? (Or, did they even give it a
second thought either way?) I can see no justification for
ascribing to the voters the interpretation offered by those who
amended the language at the Constitutional Convention, any
more than ascribing to them the interpretation that the majority
of the committee that carefully studied the wording of the
provision believed would apply if the words were added.
This example, I believe, shows the folly of looking to the
"intent" of the framers and the adopters, most especially where
the citizens are voting up or down on an entire constitution as
opposed to a single amendment. The Court simply presumes
that the "intent of the framers and of the people who adopted"
the constitution is a single concept. But there is no foundation
for that assumption and, if there is an intent that is far more
important it is the intent of those whose votes actually ratified
or defeated the constitution. Since we do not have a poll in
which each citizen exiting the ballot booth has told us what they
"intended" to approve by means of an environmental standard
when they voted for the constitution, the recourse is to simply
look to the language itself and ask what the average voter would
have thought the provision meant. And that meaning is not
dictated by what may or may not have been in the minds of
those who drafted and approved the proposed language in the
Convention. It was the task of those in the Convention to
propose language that accurately reflected their intent to the
citizens of the state. It is that language itself that was before
the citizens and was before the Court in MEIC, to be interpreted
74.
75.

Id.
Id.

1 69, 73-74.
75.
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without embellishment by statements of intent from those who
drafted the language.
Unfortunately, other than this misplaced reliance on the
intent of those who drafted the language, the Court provided no
other foundation for its conclusions regarding the meaning of
the constitutional environmental provisions. The Court never
considered alternative interpretations of this language nor the
implications of its interpretation.
D. Confusing Instructionson Remand
The Court remanded the MEIC case to the District Court for
a determination on constitutionality. 76 The District Court has
since found the case moot and, thus, the substantive issues
raised in the case were not reached. 77
Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's instructions on remand in MEIC should be an
important source of insight into the meaning of the decision.
Unfortunately, the Court's specific guidance to the District
Court was at odds with the general standards established by the
Court. This leads to even greater confusion over what the Court
actually held in MEIC.
The Court's specific guidance to the District Court on
remand can be found in two statements:
[T]o the extent § 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA (1995) arbitrarily excludes
certain "activities" from nondegradation review without regard to
the nature or volume of the substances being discharged, it
violates those environmental rights guaranteed by Article II,
78
Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution.

And:
[We] remand to the District Court for strict scrutiny of the
statutory provision in question [§ 75-5-317(2)(j)1, and in particular
for a determination of whether there is a compelling state interest
for the enactment of that statute based on the criteria we
79
articulated in Wadsworth v. State.

These two statements raise serious questions central to the
future understanding of these constitutional provisions.
The first statement could have several different meanings
with significantly different implications. One interpretation of
the Court's statement focuses on the characterization that § 7576.

Id.

881.

77. Montana Envt'l. Info. Ctr. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, No. BVD 95-1184,
slip op. at 6 (Mont. June 16, 2000).
78. MEIC, 1999 MT 248, 80, 296 Mont. 207, 80,988 P.2d 1236, 1 80.

79.

Id. 81.
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5-317(2)(j) is unconstitutional only to the extent it excludes
certain activities from nondegradation review without regard to
the nature or volume of the substances being discharged. Justice
Leaphart, in concurrence, believed this is what the Court's
statement meant.8 0 And Justice Leaphart went a step further to
find that since, in his view, the very essence of § 75-5-317(2)(j) is
to exempt a category of water discharges from nondegradation
review without consideration of the nature or volume of
substances in the water discharged, the statutory section is
unconstitutional on its face. 8 ' Under Justice Leaphart's reading
of the majority opinion, it would seem that all of the
nonsignificant
categories
in
§
75-5-317
would
be
unconstitutional on their face because it is their very essence
that they categorically exempt certain discharges from
nondegradation review without consideration of the specifics of
the contents of the discharge.
Under this interpretation, however, if a discharge exempted
from nondegradation review by § 75-5-317(2)(j) is otherwise
subject to review with regard to the nature or volume of its
discharge, then the provision is not unconstitutional. If this is
the accurate interpretation, then § 75-5-317(2)(j) would seem to
be constitutional, since any discharge falling within its terms
must be "conducted in accordance with [DEQ]-approved water
quality protection practices."8 2 In order for DEQ to establish
water quality protection practices, DEQ must consider the
nature and volume of the substances being discharged. As
evident from the facts of this case, for example, DEQ did indeed
consider the nature and volume of the substances being
discharged in establishing its approved water quality protection
practices as they governed this discharge.8 3
The Court,
including Justice Leaphart in concurrence, overlooked this
condition to the § 75-5-317(2)(j) exemption.
Another interpretation of the Court's statement emphasizes
the fact that the Court did not say § 75-5-317(2)(j) is
unconstitutional simply because it excludes certain activities
80. Id.
85 (Leaphart, J., concurring).
81. Id.
82. See the previous discussion related to this point supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
83. See MEIC,
9-16, 296 Mont. q 9-16, 988 P.2d
9-16, in which the Court
recites at length the information available to the DEQ as it evaluated the proposed
discharge. The parties may disagree over how the state responded to the information,
but there can be no doubt in this case that the DEQ considered the nature and volume of
the discharge.
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from nondegradation review without regard to the nature or
volume of the discharge. The Court said it is unconstitutional
only to the extent it arbitrarily excludes activities from
nondegradation review without regard to the nature or volume
of the discharge. Under this interpretation, the concept of
categorical nonsignificance (i.e., the practice of excluding
categories of activities from nondegradation review, which is the
essence of § 75-5-317) is not inherently unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional only if the legislature's decision to exclude such
activities is arbitrary.84
This leaves the following possible analyses of § 75-5317(2)(j).
First, since the section does not exclude covered
activities from nondegradation review without regard to the
nature or volume of the substances being discharged, the
provision is constitutional on its face. This may leave open the
question whether, as the section was applied in this particular
instance, the environmental review by the DEQ was adequate to
meet constitutional or other standards. 85 Second, assuming for
the sake of argument that the Court considered the DEQ review
under § 75-5-317(2)(j) as somehow inherently constitutionally
insufficient, § 75-5-317(2)() is still not unconstitutional on its
face.
That is, statutory, categorical exemptions from
nondegradation review are not per se unconstitutional. Section
75-5-317(2)(j),
and
presumably
similar
nonsignificant
exemptions from nondegradation review, are unconstitutional

84. Even this interpretation poses somewhat of a dilemma in this case, because, as
noted above, § 75-5-317(2)(j) does not exclude activities within its ambit without regard
to the nature or volume of the substances being discharged. As a result, one response to
applying this standard to § 75-5-317(2)(j) is that the section survives constitutional
scrutiny, because by its very terms it requires the DEQ to consider the nature and
volume of the discharge in order for the nondegradation exemption to apply.
The Court's failure to acknowledge that § 75-5-317(2)(j) requires a consideration of the
nature and volume of the discharge is problematic. It raises a question whether: (1) the
Court simply failed to understand the provision in its entirety (in which case the
provision may indeed be constitutional, even under the Court's express standard), (2) the
Court did not consider the review required under the statute to be sufficient to meet its
constitutional standard (although this is a difficult interpretation to accept when the
Court never acknowledges the provision exists), or (3) the Court did not consider the
review undertaken by DEQ in this case to be sufficient to meet the constitutional
standard (although this interpretation is also difficult to accept when the Court never
criticizes the DEQ review). I believe the Court simply failed to even consider the
condition to the statute that requires DEQ review of the nature and volume of the
discharge. This oversight by the Court is certainly confirmed by the fact the Court
throughout the opinion seems unaware of this condition to the statute at issue.
85. See the previous discussion related to this point supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
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only to the extent they arbitrarily exclude such activities from
nondegradation review. If the nondegradation exemption is not
The question becomes
arbitrary, then it is constitutional.
whether there is a rational basis for the legislature to have
exempted the activity from nondegradation review. If there is a
rational basis for the exemption, then the exemption is not
arbitrary.
Can these interpretations be squared with the Court's
second instruction to the District Court noted above8 6 to
determine "whether there is a compelling state interest for the
enactment of the statute?"8 7 The first statement says the
statute is unconstitutional if it arbitrarily excludes certain
activities from nondegradation review. The second statement
seems to return to earlier language in the opinion indicating a
statute that infringes on a fundamental right will be
constitutional only if it advances a compelling state interest.
Certainly, a statute may not be arbitrary, although it does not
further a compelling state interest. Is it enough that the
statute's categorical exemption not be arbitrary, or must it also
further a compelling state interest? This is a conflict in the
opinion that I think cannot be reconciled. The Court has simply
suggested two standards that are not the same. Perhaps
because the Court refers only once to the "arbitrary" standard
and several times to the "compelling state interest" standard, we
should ignore the reference to "arbitrary." This is not, however,
much of a foundation on which to base the interpretation of such
an important standard.
E. Did the Supreme Court Decide MEIC on an As-Applied or
FacialBasis?
Yet another problem is the uncertainty whether the Court
addressed the issue in the case as an as-applied or facial
challenge to the constitutionality of § 75-5-317(2)(j).
The
majority opinion insists that the decision "is limited to § 75-5317(2)(j), MCA (1995), as applied to the facts in this case."88 The
Court goes on: "We have not been asked to and do not hold that
this section [§ 75-5-317(2)0)] facially implicates constitutional
rights."89
86.
87.
88.
89.

See supra note 79.
MEIC, 1999 MT 248,
Id. 1 80.
Id.

81, 296 Mont. 207,
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The questions raised by the Court, and the standards
articulated by the Court, all belie Justice Trieweiler's efforts to
make this an "as-applied" decision. As characterized by Justice
Leaphart in concurrence, the challenge to the constitutionality
of § 75-5-317(2)(j) in this case is not limited to the facts in the
present case but "inheres in the statute's creation of a blanket
exception." 90 Except for the Court's assertions that this is an asapplied rather than a facial challenge, there is nothing in the
majority opinion to support that conclusion.
Whether MEIC was an as-applied or facial challenge has
substantial implications for how the holding of the case is to be
understood by all concerned. It makes a substantial difference
whether the statute itself or the application of the statute is to
be tested against the standards for constitutionality established
by the Court. For example, under the facts of MEIC, should a
court closely scrutinize the legislature's adoption of § 75-5317(2)(j) or the DEQ's particular approval of the well water
discharges from SPJV pursuant to § 75-5-317(2)(j)? Is the
question whether the legislature had a compelling state interest
for adopting § 75-5-317(2)(j) or whether there is a compelling
state interest for allowing SPJV's test wells to discharge in this
instance without undergoing nondegradation review? These are
two entirely different avenues of inquiry.
The Court's
instruction to the District Court to determine "whether there is
a compelling state interest for the enactment of that statute" 91
certainly indicated the subject of the inquiry is the legislature's
objective in adopting the statute in the first place. Yet that very
instruction comes only one sentence after the Court stated
forcefully that it is not addressing the facial validity of the
statute. Again, the Court has made understanding its decision
far more difficult than necessary.
The same dilemma arises in addressing the standard that
the state action must be limited so as to interfere with the
environmental right to the least amount possible while still
achieving the state's objective. Is the inquiry whether § 75-5317(2)(j) is closely tailored to meet the state's objective, or
whether the DEQ's approval of the discharge limited the
discharge to the maximum extent feasible? Again, under one
approach the focus is the action of the legislature in adopting
the statutory provision; under the other approach the focus is

90.
91.

Id.
Id.

8 (Leaphart, J., concurring).
85
881.
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the action of the agency in dealing with the particular proposed
92
discharge.
F. The Court's Endorsement of§ 75-5-303.
The Court included an interesting, and I think very
informative, endorsement of the general nondegradation statute:
We conclude that for purposes of the facts presented in this case, §
75-5-303, MCA is a reasonable legislative implementation of the
mandate provided for in Article IX, Section 1 ..... 93

92. The Court's analysis and standards speak louder than the Court's attempt to
characterize that analysis and those standards. The Court has called into question the
facial validity of § 75-5-317(2)j). The criteria and standards set forth by the Court all go
to the essential nature of that statutory exemption; they do not depend on the particular
facts of this case. Although the Court did note that the discharge here contained a
known carcinogen which would be discharged in concentrations higher than the
concentration present in the receiving water, the essence of the Court's concern is not the
discharge itself, but rather that the discharge appears to have been authorized without
regard to the nature or volume of the substances being discharged.
93. MEIC, 80, 296 Mont. T 80, 988 P.2d T 80. Section 75-5-303 provides:
(1) Existing uses of state waters and the level of water quality necessary to
protect those uses must be maintained and protected.
(2) Unless authorized by the department under subsection (3) or exempted
from review under 75-5-317, the quality of high-quality waters must be
maintained.
(3) The department may not authorize degradation of high-quality waters
unless it has been affirmatively demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence
to the department that:
(a) degradation is necessary because there are no economically,
environmentally, and technologically feasible modifications to the
proposed project that would result in no degradation;
(b) the proposed project will result in important economic or social
development and that the benefit of the development exceeds the costs to
society of allowing degradation of high-quality waters;
(c) existing and anticipated use of state waters will be fully protected; and
(d) the least degrading water quality protection practices determined by
the department to be economically, environmentally, and technologically
feasible will be fully implemented by the applicant prior to and during the
proposed activity.
(4) The department shall issue a preliminary decision either denying or
authorizing degradation and shall provide public notice and a 30-day comment
period prior to issuing a final decision. The department's preliminary and final
decisions must include:
(a) a statement of the basis for the decision; and
(b) a detailed description of all conditions applied to any authorization to
degrade state waters, including, when applicable, monitoring
requirements,
required
water protection
practices,
reporting
requirements, effluent limits, designation of the mixing zones, the limits
of degradation authorized, and methods of determining compliance with
the authorization for degradation.
(5) An interested person wishing to challenge a final department decision may
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This comment is noteworthy in several respects. First, it
strongly suggests that the constitutional infirmity in MEIC, if
there was one, rested not with the fact that SPJV was allowed to
discharge from its wells to the waters of the state (even where
that discharge contained a carcinogen in a concentration greater
than existed in the receiving water), but with the fact that this
discharge was allowed to proceed without first undergoing the
nondegradation review dictated by § 75-5-303.
Second, and perhaps even more significant, is the balancing
approach of § 75-5-303. Note again - the Court's statement
that this section "is a reasonable legislative implementation of
the [constitutional] mandate."94 The very essence of the
nondegradation policy expressed in § 75-5-303 is a balancing of
environmental protection with economic and social values.
Section 303 does not prohibit water quality degradation, rather
it allows degradation, but only where:
1. existing95 and anticipated uses of state waters will be fully
protected;
2. the proposed activity will result in important economic or social
development and the benefit of that development
exceeds the costs
96
to society of allowing the degradation;
3. there are no economically, environmentally and technologically
feasible modifications to the proposed activity that would result in
no degradation; 9 7 and
4. the least degrading water quality protection practices that are
economically, environmentally and
technologically feasible will be
98
implemented during the activity.

Thus, while the Court in MEIC

concluded that the

request a hearing before the board within 30 days of the final department
decision. The contested case procedures of Title 2, chapter 4, part 6, apply to a
hearing under this section.
(6) Periodically, but not more often than every 5 years, the department may
review authorizations to degrade state waters. Following the review, the
department may, after timely notice and opportunity for hearing, modify the
authorization if the department determines that an economically,
environmentally, and technologically feasible modification to the development
exists. The decision by the department to modify an authorization may be
appealed to the board.
(7) The board may not issue an authorization to degrade state waters that are
classified as outstanding resource waters.
(8) The board shall adopt rules to implement this section.
94. MEIC, 1 80, 296 Mont. 80, 988 P.2d 80.
95. MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-303(3)(c) (1999).
96.
97.
98.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-303(3)(b) (1999).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-303(3)(a) (1999).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-303(3)(d) (1999).
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environmental rights in Montana's 1972 Constitution are
fundamental 99 and that they create enforceable limits at least on
legislative action, 10 0 the Court has also held that these rights are
subject to a balancing against other, important public values
such as economic and social development.
As with other
fundamental rights, they are subject to infringement in
appropriate circumstances. The Court's endorsement of § 75-5303 indicates economic and social development are among the
values to be balanced against these environmental rights.
IV. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR How THE COURT MIGHT PROCEED
The Court's decision in MEIC has done little to advance our
understanding of Montana's constitutional environmental
provisions. Indeed, the Court's inadequate effort to address
these provisions has simply added to the confusion and
uncertainty over what these provisions mean and how they are
to be applied. Further, the lack of rigorous analysis and failure
to confront the complex issues posed by these provisions denies
the opinion the jurisprudential and moral force essential to such
an important opinion.
My suggestion for the Court is it either withdraw the MEIC
opinion or otherwise repudiate it. Fortunately, the District
Court has since held the case moot, so the particular case itself
has been resolved without reliance on the opinion. 101 There is no
shortage of other cases that can provide the Court the
opportunity to expound on the meaning of Montana's
constitutional environmental provisions. When that opportunity
arises, the Court should exhibit the courage to acknowledge the
shortcomings of the MEIC opinion and proceed afresh to address
the meaning and application of these provisions. Rather than
trying to explain its way around the shortcomings and
inconsistencies in MEIC, the Court needs to place MEIC on a
shelf behind closed doors. The Court can then squarely confront
the difficult issues and implications raised by the interpretation
of these provisions, and provide a decision to guide the citizens
99. MEIC,
56, 296 Mont.
56, 988 P.2d
56. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
100. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
101. Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, No. BVD 95-1184,
slip op. at 6 (Mont. June 16, 2000).
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of Montana, as well as their legislature and courts.
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